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Abstract: Oswaldo Aranha was one of the most famous and prestigious Brazilian politicians of the 20th century. Known for presiding 
the UN session when the State of Israel was created, Aranha had an important role in Brazilian politics during the first half of the 
century. Even though he held a bachelor’s degree in Law, Aranha had to deal with various economic issues along his political career. 
This paper aims to analyze his economic ideas, arguing that despite his liberal influences, he became an interventionist policymaker in 
Getúlio Vargas’s administrations. We argue that his experience as the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington played a central role in the 
changes of his ideological positions and economic ideas.
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Resumen: Oswaldo Aranha fue uno de los políticos brasileños más importantes y prestigiosos del siglo XX. Conocido por presidir la 
sesión de la ONU cuando se creó el Estado de Israel, Aranha tuvo un papel aún más relevante en la política brasileña durante la primera 
mitad del siglo. Aunque licenciado en Derecho, Aranha tuvo que lidiar con diferentes problemas económicos a lo largo de su carrera 
política. El propósito de este artículo es analizar sus ideas económicas, argumentando que, a pesar de sus influencias liberales, Aranha 
se convirtió en un formulador de políticas intervencionistas durante los mandatos de Getúlio Vargas. Argumentamos que su experiencia 
como embajador brasileño en Washington tuvo un papel central en las mudanzas de sus posiciones ideológicas y sus ideas económicas.
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1. Introduction
Known for his prolific international career, Oswal-
do Aranha is considered the most important Brazil-
ian diplomat since José Maria Paranhos (Ricupero, 
2017). Famed for the opportunity of chairing the 
United Nations General Assembly, Aranha gained 
the prestige of the foreign establishment like no other 
Brazilian of his generation.
Even though the deference to his diplomatic ca-
reer could be justified for the prestige he gained in 
international arenas, Brazilian historiography might 
underestimate the other virtues of the young politi-
cian who led the 1930 Revolution and became one 
of the most relevant public men in his country in the 
first half of the 20th century. Minister of several port-
folios throughout the Vargas Era (1930-1945; 1951-
1954), Aranha was considered the second man in the 
hierarchy of the Republic, position from which he 
contributed to the current formatting of Brazilian in-
stitutions, in its positive and negative aspects, during 
the two decades in which Getúlio Vargas ruled the 
country.
Despite the abundance of predicates that histo-
rians use to qualify his career, his economic ideas 
are not properly known2. Although he had studied 
economic issues only at the Faculty of Law, Aranha 
had to deal with various economic topics along his 
political career. Born in 1894 in Alegrete, a small 
city close to the border with Argentina, Oswaldo 
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Euclydes de Sousa Aranha was son of a traditional 
farmer from São Paulo who moved to the south after 
getting married to local woman. Educated at home by 
his mother, he went to a Jesuit school in São Leopol-
do, a municipality close to the capital of the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul. Unlike most of his future partners 
who belonged to the so-called “Geração 1907”’ –who 
had attended law schools in São Paulo or Porto Ale-
gre (Love, 1975)–, Oswaldo moved to Rio de Janeiro 
at the age of 14. He graduated in Law in 1916.
In the capital of the Republic, Aranha realized he 
was closer to the Federalists than to the official party 
which his father was linked to –and which he would 
take up arms in the future, the Riograndense Repub-
lican Party (PRR)–. A declared admirer of the liber-
al Senator Rui Barbosa, the student leader protested 
Hermes da Fonseca’s government, and fought against 
Senator José Pinheiro Machado, the main leader of 
his party in Rio de Janeiro. He also attended the uni-
versity group known as “Gaspar Martins”, a tribute 
to the top leader of the opposition to PRR in the 19th 
century. Once graduated, he returned to the southern 
border to work as a lawyer in 1917, when he met 
Getúlio Vargas, who was also working in that area.
Despite his friendship with Joaquim Assis Brasil, 
leader of the Libertador Party and opponent of the 
Republicans in Rio Grande do Sul, Aranha’s fami-
ly supported, in 1922, the fifth reelection of Antônio 
Borges de Medeiros, leader of the PRR. Although he 
had never thought of abandoning his party, Oswaldo 
had to overcome his political-ideological convictions 
to maintain the compromise previously agreed with 
Medeiros.
In 1923, when the last of several conflicts in Rio 
Grande do Sul between chimangos (republicans) and 
maragatos (liberals) broke out, Aranha quit his law-
yer career to lead one of the main platoons of offi-
cial troops, the 5th Corps of the West Brigade. In the 
following years, he kept fighting on the battlefield, 
when he was shot in the shoulder and, more seriously, 
in the foot.
In January 1924, Borges de Medeiros chose him 
to be the head of police in the border region; in the 
following year, he became mayor of Alegrete. Two 
years later, he was concomitantly elected to the state 
and federal deputies, position he held only for a few 
months3. When Vargas took over the state administra-
tion in 1928, he invited Aranha to be the Secretary of 
Interior and Justice, when he was in charge to write 
his first text on economic matters.
Despite the good relations he had with the poli-
ticians from São Paulo, Aranha articulated the for-
mation of the Frente Única Gaúcha (Unique Gaucha 
3 Being a Congressman was not his favorite political activity: “I confess that I did not like it. I was a State Deputy one day, and I was a Federal Deputy, 
I believe for four or five months, and I did not feel a vocation for this, and for that reason I did not plead for these positions again” (apud Aita and 
Axt, 1999, 82).
4 In January 1947, Oswaldo Aranha visited the United States to take part in an event at the World Affairs Council, when, due to the death of the 
diplomat who had been appointed to head the Brazilian representation at the UN, President Dutra invited him to assume the position (Almeida and 
Araújo, 2013, 691).
5 President Vargas has always encouraged the rivalry between Aranha and the diplomat João Neves da Fontoura, another revolutionary leader. Thus, 
he could behave as a judge, diluting the strength of both.
Front) and the Aliança Liberal (Liberal Alliance). 
After Júlio Prestes’s victory in the 1930 election, he 
commanded the insurrection that would put an end to 
the period so-called “Old Republic”. In charge of the 
political and military organization of the revolution, 
Aranha’s leadership went beyond the borders of his 
state.
Thus, the real dimension of Aranha’s role in the 
Revolution of 1930 must be reconsidered. Given 
Getúlio’s conciliatory behavior, he would hardly 
have headed an armed action. With José Antônio 
Flores da Cunha and a few dozen soldiers, the com-
batant –who had threatened to resign his position in 
the government in protest to “the weakness of his 
leader that he discouraged the soldiers themselves” 
(apud Hilton, 1994, 49)– Aranha led the invasion of 
the Army Headquarters, in Porto Alegre, on the night 
of October 3, 1930. Three weeks later, Washington 
Luís was overthrown by the Armed Forces at the Ca-
tete Palace.
In Vargas’ first government, Oswaldo Aranha as-
sumed four different positions: Ministry of Justice 
(1930-1931) and Finance (1931-1934), the embas-
sy in Washington (1934-1937) and the chancellery 
(1938-1944). His performance as a public policy-
maker between the revolution (1930) and the end of 
World War II (1945) will be analyzed from the sec-
ond section of this article.
His liberal positions made him support Eduardo 
Gomes, from the National Democratic Union (UDN), 
in the 1945 national election. Even so, he was nomi-
nated by the elected president, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, 
to assume the leadership of the Brazilian delegation 
in the United Nations, in 1947. Due to a series of co-
incidences4, he presided the meeting in which the UN 
created the State of Israel.
Away from political activities since the late 1940s, 
Oswaldo started to dedicate himself to law and busi-
ness representation activities. He returned to politics 
in 1953, when the severe political and economic cri-
sis that Brazil was going through made Getúlio Var-
gas invite him to be the Minister of Finance again. 
During Kubitscheck’s administration (1956-1961), 
he headed the Brazilian delegation at the 12th UN 
General Assembly, in 1957. From then on, he defin-
itively abandoned his political career. Oswaldo Ara-
nha died in 1960, in Rio de Janeiro, at the age of six-
ty-five years old, from a heart attack.
For all these reasons, it was expected that Oswal-
do Aranha had become Getúlio Vargas’ natural suc-
cessor. However, the mistrust of the president did not 
allow Aranha to become a feasible candidate5. After 
1954, his name was constantly considered to be nom-
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inated the candidate by Vargas’ party (Brazilian La-
bor Party). Perhaps the minister himself recognized 
that, influential among politicians, he never gained 
the popular support that a leader of the nation neces-
sarily needs. That is why Berson (1971, 35) declared 
that “Aranha would become a leader of the people; 
never a popular leader”.
2. Oswaldo Aranha’s economic thought
Despite the number of letters Oswaldo Aranha sent 
to his family members and supporters since adoles-
cence, he did not write documents or articles that re-
flect his most important political or economic ideas. 
The natural speaker was not exactly a fruitful writer6, 
so official documents, such as reports and speeches, 
become important sources for the researcher who in-
tends to study and interpret his ideas.
A first feature that would come to influence his 
political trajectory was the distance he maintained 
from positivism, the official ideology of the PRR that 
had been spread in Rio Grande do Sul by the party’s 
patriarch, Júlio de Castilhos. Whether by paternal in-
fluence or by the fact he studied in Rio de Janeiro, 
Oswaldo can be considered the most liberal of the 
republican leaders from Rio Grande do Sul who took 
office in 1930 (Lago, 1996). His “original liberal-
ism” did not prevent him to adopt intervention pol-
icies when he became Minister of Finance, though. 
According to Fonseca’s definition (2015), there is 
not such a thing as a “liberal interventionism”, so the 
matching of these two doctrines becomes possible 
only in specific historical situations.
Regarding specifically to his theoretical influenc-
es, it is known that, before moving to Washington, in 
1934, Aranha had the 5 volumes of the work of the 
French economist Clément Colson, and Principles of 
Economics, by Alfred Marshall7. In the United States, 
Oswaldo got, among other books, a copy of the first 
edition of the General Theory of Employment, In-
terest and Money, by John Maynard Keynes8. Such 
doctrinal eclecticism would influence not only on 
his ideas, but also the policies adopted by Minister 
Oswaldo Aranha.
6 Despite his well-known cognitive ability, Oswaldo Aranha himself admitted that he had little aptitude for intellectual activities: “I have a more acute 
practical spirit than the theoretical... I am more of a man of action than of ideation” (apud Hilton, 1994, 3); “I was born more to act than to think 
and write” (apud Hilton, 1994, 9).
7 This is the only information his grandson, the economist Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago, knows about his grandfather’s interests in economics. Ac-
cording to Lago, Aranha was not the kind of politician used to study economic and political problems by a theoretical point of view. Even though 
he confirms that Aranha has read at least part of the books he bought in the United States, Lago did not confirm how those authors influenced his 
political measures after becoming the most important minister in Vargas’s administration.
8 The influence of the General Theory was clear when he took over the Ministry of Finance in 1953. Even though he defended orthodox measures, he 
admitted the convenience of countercyclical action as a way of mitigating the insufficiency of effective demand: “It cannot be denied that, to some 
extent, some imbalances and unevenness can constitute real stimuli for sectors where there is a relative delay, as it is certain that strong demand 
drives supply. This automatism, however, is severely impaired in inflationary situations, during which responses to demand stimulus take too long 
due to the rupture in the relationship between prices” (Aranha, 1953a).
9 Although analytical categories as “conservatism” should be nuanced by the historical circumstances, some Aranha’s measures and statements could 
frame him as a conservative politician. He proposed, for instance, the suppression of alcoholic beverages, any type of gambling and prostitution in 
the beginning of his political career. In addition, it imposed restrictions for female participation in certain audiences unrelated to education or health 
(Berson, 1971, 60). According to the same author, Aranha also defended that immigrants moved in Brazil, if they were Arians: “We need in Brazil 
whites, whites and always whites, and nothing from other races — neither Indians, nor blacks, nor yellow” (apud Berson, 1971, 224).
10 Oswaldo Aranha stated, in 1936, that “American civilization stands out from the rest due to its material characteristics (...). The truth is that the 
2.1. Liberalism in Aranha
Although he defined himself as a liberal in the An-
glo-Saxon sense of the term, Aranha was, in political 
terms, a man of 20th century. Thus, he remained equi-
distant from the poles that would characterize world 
geopolitics after the 1920s: “Brazil is threatened 
by two evils: mediocre fascism or empirical com-
munism. To save it, there is only liberal democracy” 
(apud Flores, 1991, 45). Despite the moderation of 
his speeches, there were several opportunities when 
he could be considered a conservative politician9: “I 
increasingly believe in the fruitful action of conserv-
ative ideas [...]” (Aranha, 1927). His anti-communist 
conviction ratifies this understanding, since he did 
not hesitate to ally himself with the integralist leader 
Plínio Salgado to fight what he called “sovietism”.
From an economic point of view, the way he de-
fended some Brazilian policymakers with conserv-
ative ideas reveals his preferences. Aranha referred 
to the former Minister of Finance as the “great and 
unequaled Joaquim Murtinho”, “the greatest of all 
in this country”, to whom he attributed the solution 
to the crisis of the first republican decade (Aranha, 
1934a). To Eugenio Gudin, “master of our masters”, 
whose advice he considered “superiorly wise and 
opportune” (Aranha, 1953c), Aranha sent a letter in 
which he declared his irrevocable creed in liberalism, 
saying “it is no longer necessary to believe in men or 
in governments” (apud Berson, 1971, 217).
The experience as an ambassador in the United 
States can be considered the turning point in Ara-
nha’s ideas. Regardless of New Deal policies, the 
time that Oswaldo lived in the US was one of the 
most rapid GDP growth in the first half of the cen-
tury. He believed such progress was due to the tradi-
tional liberalism. In a letter sent to Vargas, he stated 
that “everything here is the work of freedom”; to Pe-
dro Góes Monteiro, Minister of War, he testified that 
it was “without action by the governments, that these 
people created a nation that holds more than half of 
the universal wealth”10 (apud Hilton, 1994, 206). In 
1947, at the head of the UN General Assembly, he de-
fended, without worrying about the obvious exagger-
ation of his declaration, that the only solution for the 
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world would be “its Americanization”11. In Berson’s 
opinion (1971), the lessons learned from the North 
American reality were responsible for converting the 
ideas of a man who, recently, had supported the adop-
tion of “Napoleonic measures” as an excellent means 
of organizing social activities.
Although too schematic, the defense of liberal-
ism in Aranha can be summarized in the following 
cardinal points: (1) agrarian vocation; (2) free trade; 
(3) balanced budget; and (4) importance of private 
business.
At the beginning of the 1920s, as a young lawyer 
in Rio Grande do Sul, face to the crisis in agriculture, 
Aranha defended that these activities were more rel-
evant to the development of the state than industrial 
ones. He suggested that it was necessary to put “a 
brake on the teeth of insatiable industrial commer-
cialism” in order to “enter a serene path of construc-
tion and improvement, without high greedy dreams” 
(Aranha, 1922). When he took over the Ministry 
of Finance in 1931, he showed the same awareness 
about the importance of coffee for Brazilian econo-
my:
The coffee issue is not from São Paulo; it is Brazil-
ian and regards to everyone. It is not a political issue. It 
is a matter of administration and specialized technique. 
The president will decide to keep the Institute [of Cof-
fee], expanding his action both in terms of maintaining 
prices and in terms of increasing exports. (apud Almei-
da, 2017, 573)
In a conference held at the Chamber of Commerce 
of the State of New York, he had defended Brazilian 
agrarian vocation by stimulating free trade with the 
United States: “(North American) capital to be in-
vested in Brazil must target the sources of its natural 
wealth in order to make them exportable, allowing 
my country to buy its unique manufactures here from 
American industry” (Aranha, 1936a).
This was another feature of his liberal principles: 
the defense of international free trade. Aranha at-
tacked the “assumption that national wealth is wa-
tertight, and that international trade is limited”, a 
premise that would support the false idea that “the 
prosperity of one nation is only possible through the 
impoverishment of another” (Aranha, 1937). In the 
same speech, he also defended that, according to the 
rules of “good economy”, it was necessary to “buy to 
sell and sell to buy, resisting economic nationalism”.
Endorsing free trade, his statements corroborate 
the fruitfulness of foreign trade: “In a world of highly 
prosperous nations, each nation would gain advan-
tage from the prosperity of the others”, said the for-
mer chancellor in New York (Aranha, 1947b). Be-
yond geopolitical motivations, he repeatedly defend-
cultural progress of that country has reached an unparalleled degree of perfection, but it is no less true that it has not fallen from the sky, on the 
contrary, it is the product of the effort of a people that acquired the ability to create, produce and to build this greatness with their own ideas, with 
their own hands” (Aranha, 1936a).
11 “We Brazilians envisage just one solution for the world: its Americanization” (Aranha, 1947a).
ed that Brazil had to restore diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union based, fundamentally, on its trade 
potential (Cervo, 1998).
If he was not influenced by positivism during 
his formal education, Oswaldo Aranha agreed with 
the only liberal facet of Auguste Comte’s doctrine: 
balanced budget. Since the experience at his home-
town administration, Oswaldo opposed, in different 
circumstances, the policy of taking loans. The main 
reason was that the future burden for the public treas-
ury would not only not compensate the indebtedness, 
but it would make “normal tax activities” even more 
difficult.
Before assuming the Ministry of Finance for the 
first time, in 1931, he again attested that “without a 
balanced budget, I will not be Minister of Finance”, 
since “a country without the capacity to balance its 
budgets is like a ship that cannot resume its course” 
(apud Hilton, 1994, 118). At the same time, he wrote 
a letter to Borges de Medeiros criticizing certain 
states for incurring fiscal deficits, reminding he was 
the first Minister to end the year with balanced budget 
since the Campos Salles administration (1898-1902). 
In 1954, Aranha opposed the proposal of the Minister 
of Labor, João Goulart, to grant a nominal increase of 
100% to the minimum wage, a measure he classified 
as “anarchy of the treasury” (apud O’Donnell, 1976, 
83).
Finally, but no less important, it is relevant to re-
veal a position not common for a politician of the 
1930s. Key issues to modern liberalism, such as effi-
ciency and productivity in public services, were pres-
ent in his speeches. For Aranha, public action could 
not be the final reason for the State to act. When 
he was mayor of his hometown, in 1925, he disap-
proved the possession of various equipment and pub-
lic buildings and requested authorization to “make 
the sale of all that he deems harmful to our assets 
or unnecessary to public services” (Aranha, 1925). 
Almost thirty years later, he again ratified the same 
understanding when he defended the relevance of the 
business for the sustainability of economic growth: 
“The integrated and harmonious development will 
always be impeded if any disorderly growth of the 
private sectors occurs” (Aranha, 1953a).
Despite clear demonstrations of his belief in lib-
eralism, Aranha’s biography would have to compro-
mise the interventionist policies that the minister 
would defend throughout his political trajectory.
2.2. State intervention
The referred theoretical eclecticism of Oswaldo 
Aranha’s economic thought can be measured by his 
ability to endorse interventionist policies without 
abdicating, however, his liberal premises. The main 
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instruments of interventionism policies defended by 
Aranha can be summarized in: (1) state intervention; 
(2) industrialization; (3) protectionism; and (4) na-
tionalism.
Although the intervention defended by positiv-
ists was not one of the main ideas he learned from 
Comte’s doctrine, Aranha agreed with some positivist 
policies. As soon he was elected mayor of his home-
town Alegrete, he promised to use the state prerog-
ative to achieve the purposes of his administration: 
“It is necessary to have wills –teaches Comte– to 
complete the laws, to consolidate the order, to make 
progress” (Aranha, 1925).
In charge of Getúlio Vargas’ program, he coordi-
nated an economic panorama of the state, published, 
in 1929: “The trade in Rio Grande do Sul”. The docu-
ment listed various areas where the state intervention 
was not only necessary, but also required. Thus, he 
explained the crisis that the colonial cultures of Rio 
Grande do Sul went through with these words: “Ad-
venturous empiricism, dispersive individualism, free 
disorderly competition”. In the end, Aranha conclud-
ed: it was due to “lack of a collective discipline, of a 
higher orientation” (Aranha, 1929).
In April 1934, Aranha made, in a session of the 
National Constituent Assembly, his most incisive 
speech in defense of state intervention. There were 
several moments when the Minister of Finance 
moved away from liberalism to define what he char-
acterized as “the modern state”. In his point of view, 
“government action today is no longer that of the last 
century, when the vain and theoretical formulas that 
we are trying to imitate were erected”. Furthermore, 
he announced that the “modern state, whatever the 
form of government, has left the orbit traced by our 
political past to extend its intervention on fields and 
activities until recently prohibited to the action of the 
public policymakers”. Finally, speaking about the 
causes of the economic depression of the 1930s, he 
ended the speech concluding that “the peoples could 
no longer stand with their arms crossed the anach-
ronism of individualist theories, of pseudo liberals, 
nor even the empire of immortal principles, when the 
human frame what has been reduced by these ide-
ologies is the most bitter and sad in universal histo-
ry”. Thus, the crisis would have resulted, in his view, 
from the “exploitation of man by man, without the in-
tervention and protection of the state” (apud Flores, 
1991, 61).
Aranha acknowledges the importance of the mar-
ket laws to guarantee the good functioning of the 
economy. Even so, he pleased the monetary policy as 
a means of instigating the ‘animal spirit’ of entrepre-
neurs: “The currency obeys its own laws, superior to 
our laws. The currency can, however, be the instru-
ment of a policy. There are no currencies, but politics 
in our times, said a great professor of finance” (Ara-
12 According to Curi (2018), Wagemann was recognized for proposing countercyclical policies to combat the German economic crisis of the 1930s. 
The disruption of the Weimar Republic and the consequent rise of Nazism, however, prevented his ideas from becoming public policy.
nha, 1953c). He also attributed to the public power 
the responsibility for investments, especially in in-
frastructure, when the private sector does not do it 
properly: “There are sectors in which the State has 
to act promptly and energetically, in order to remove 
obstacles and eliminate certain bottlenecks in the na-
tional economy” (Aranha, 1953a).
Although he was aware of the importance of the 
agriculture for the Brazilian economy, Oswaldo Ara-
nha considered manufacturing a relevant sector for 
the economic development of the country. Quoting 
Ernst Wagemann12, a German economist known for 
the defense of the state intervention, Aranha believed 
in the “harmonic development” of Brazil, given that 
“when industry and agriculture are in a balanced 
situation, the country’s economy is highly resistant 
against crises” (Aranha, 1936b).
In a letter addressed to President Getúlio Vargas, 
in the end of 1942, Aranha summarized what Bra-
zil’s economic strategy should be after the end of 
the world conflict: “Creation of an industrial park 
for heavy industries; creation of the war industry; 
creation of agricultural, extractive and light ore in-
dustries complementary to the Americans and nec-
essary for world reconstruction; extension of rail-
ways and highways for economic and strategic pur-
poses; exploration of essential fuels” (apud Almei-
da and Araújo, 2013, 704). There is a clear emphasis 
on what, at that moment, was the most appropriate 
plan: heavy industrialization, if it was associated 
with American capital.
Even though he has repeatedly declared himself 
a defender of free trade, Aranha endorsed protec-
tionist trade policies more than once during Vargas 
Era. In 1934, he defended that “the so-called free-
dom of trade was not and is not, given the power of 
concentration and direction of capital, but a farce: an 
economy directed by particular interests associated 
to explore and to profit” (apud Flores, 1991, 62). In 
a letter addressed to Chancellor José Carlos de Mac-
edo Soares, a central character in making feasible 
US investments in Brazil, Aranha accused the trade 
agreement with the United States — which, ironi-
cally, would be celebrated with joy by himself eight 
months later — to be detrimental to the most legit-
imate national interests, especially industrial devel-
opment. In an unusual tone even for chauvinist poli-
ticians, he resorted to nationalist rhetoric to attack it: 
“We neither want nor can we accept indirect vassals” 
(apud O’Donnell, 1976, 84).
From a nationalist point of view, he defended the 
impossibility of the universalization of theories and 
the geographical transposition of historical experi-
ences. Defending the state intervention, he suggested 
that it was “useless, for the solution of the universal 
problem, the adoption of normal rules and standards, 
however good and recommendable they may be, 
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even if it were the Ten Commandments. An adjust-
ment is needed within each country, by its own peo-
ple, of its own internal problems”. During the Great 
Depression, he believed that only national and na-
tionalists’ policies would overcome the international 
crisis: “May each nation find, within its own borders, 
the solution to their difficulties” (Aranha, 1937).
Anticipating the debate about the creation of 
the largest Brazilian company and symbol of an era 
(Petrobras), Oswaldo Aranha yet disapproved (in 
the 1930s) the participation of foreign capital in the 
exploitation of Brazilian oil: “The contract requires 
that it be truly nationalized capital, not accepting for-
eign complaints about it” (apud Hilton, 1994, 163). 
To justify his position, he alleged the imprudence 
of “giving the economic fortunes of a people to the 
predominance of trusts, monopolies and industrial 
supercapitalism” (Aranha, 1934b). Aranha kept the 
same beliefs two decades later, when he denied to 
foreign capital the possibility of carrying stock op-
tions in Petrobras: “My experience in the public life 
of our country does not allow me to agree to any con-
cession to Brazilians and less to foreigners for the 
exploitation of national wealth” (apud O’Donnell, 
1976, p. 83). Thus, he defended a Brazilian and state-
owned company.
Although the elements presented in this paper 
could not explain all the reasons for the “turning 
point” of his economic ideas, we suggest that his ex-
perience in Washington as the Brazilian ambassador 
in the United States played a crucial role on his po-
litical and economic positions. First, Aranha was a 
young man after becoming Vargas’s main political 
advisor and, some years later, the most important 
connection with the country that would support Bra-
zilian industrialization and economic development. 
Therefore, his political and economic ideas were not 
completely defined before the 1930 Revolution.
The American ideological environment might 
also have had an important role, especially if we con-
sider the rise of the Soviet Union as a global super-
power along the 1930’s. Besides, the main political 
reason why President Vargas nominated him to the 
most relevant diplomatic position required a specific 
geopolitical and ideological attitude. Regardless his 
former ideas, Aranha understood he and the Brazilian 
government had to adapt to the new global context 
that was arising after the Second World War.
3. Oswaldo Aranha as Minister of Finance
Although Oswaldo Aranha’s diplomatic career is 
more notorious than his political activities, the two 
times he oversaw Brazilian economy were consid-
ered successful considering the challenges the coun-
try was facing. Simonsen (1996, 383), for example, 
corroborates this point of view by stating that the 
“double passages by the command of national fi-
nances is less important in his biography than the 
achievements in politics and diplomacy. But, if his 
life had been limited to what he did at the Ministry of 
Finance, Aranha would have already won a captive 
seat in the history of Brazil”.
The main issues he dealt with in the first time he 
was in charge of the economy (1931-1934) were the 
crisis of the coffee crops and the consequent rene-
gotiation of the foreign debt. In the second period 
(1953-1954), he proposed a severe fiscal adjustment 
and formulated a successful policy to mitigate the se-
vere exchange restriction at that time.
Thus, we defend that Aranha kept most part of 
his liberal premises, although he had to accept some 
interventionist policies to control economic cycles: 
if in the 1930s the global economic collapse made 
necessary a countercyclical action of the state, the ad-
justment of the 1950s could be understood as a sine 
qua non condition for economic growth (Fonseca, 
2010). Like one of his icons, Rui Barbosa in 1889, 
Oswaldo Aranha temporarily forgot his liberal con-
victions to behave as an interventionist policy maker.
3.1. Vargas’ first administration (1930-1945)
The revolutionary government took office during the 
most severe economic crisis in the history of capi-
talism. The international depression directly affected 
Brazilian economy by at least two ways: the fall of 
demand for Brazilian products and the collapse of the 
financing sources of the external debt.
The first Minister of Finance of the new govern-
ment, the banker from São Paulo José Maria Whitak-
er, tried to keep a conservative-orthodox economic 
policy, both from a fiscal point of view and in rela-
tion to external debt. The global recession, however, 
made the defense of coffee his task number one. The 
problems the coffee farmers had been facing since 
the late 1920s –which exports, from 1928, fell from 
90 million pounds/year to less than 40 at the begin-
ning of the following decade–, combined with polit-
ical crisis, convinced Oswaldo Aranha to accept an 
exceptional intervention in the market.
As soon as he took office in December 1931, 
Aranha tried to change the economic policies that 
Whitaker had adopted. Despite his conservative dis-
course, since the minister himself said “contrary to 
government intervention in the country’s commercial 
life to value products and maintain artificial indus-
tries” (apud Hilton, 1994, 119), Oswaldo adopted 
measures to support the coffee farmers, which main-
tained the level of domestic income.
The most well-known policy adopted in his ad-
ministration was the purchase and destruction of mil-
lions of bags of coffee, a measure that he considered 
to be “unenforceable and against good economic 
sense” (apud Hilton, 1994, 119). 30% of the pro-
duction was stocked, the same amount was export-
ed and the remaining 40% was burnt, the “sacrifice 
quota” (Abreu, 2010, 5). He was probably aware of 
the countercyclical effects of this measure to keep 
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the level of the national income because his fiscal 
policy was clearly expansionist, which resulted in 
budget deficits throughout the period13. Some of the 
most relevant economic data during his first experi-
13 According to data presented by Abreu (2014, 84), fiscal deficits remained above 12% of aggregate spending between 1931 and 1933; after this 
period, the monetary base also grew again.
14 The impression that Sir Niemeyer had drawn from the two previous agreements was not the most encouraging: “The man who sinks three times in 
general drowns” (apud Abreu, 2001, 16). Years later, when the “Aranha mission” succeeds in 1939, the same Rothschild’s representative suggested 
that, if Brazil did not honor his commitments, “he would be ignored, with disgust, like a deadbeat” by the London city (apud Abreu, 1975, 60).
15 The less bellicose strategy adopted by American negotiators reflected Roosevelt’s good-neighborhood policy. England, in turn, increased the influ-
ence in Argentina as much as it became less important in Brazil, since the trade deficits in which the USA incurred here guaranteed it a distinctive 
place in Brazilian diplomacy. This unveiled dispute between the two main creditors led the British representative to affirm that the United States 
saw Brazil “as its own backyard”, getting mad “when anyone else comes to play in it without being invited” (apud Abreu, 2001, 23).
16 Trying to acquire public opinion, Aranha announced that Brazil would pay nearly a third of its contractual debt for the four years following the 
agreement. It is possible to check the inaccuracy of his statement in the fact that the minister calculated interest and amortizations together, which 
was not exactly true: “Whether Brazil pays 90 million pounds over 4 years, we will receive the full coupon, that is, the discharge of 90 million, 
which represents, for the federal, state and municipal treasuries, an advantage of 57 million pounds that have not been paid” (Aranha, 1934a). There 
was a decrease in service indeed, from 24 to up to 9 million pounds in the period of the agreement, as well as a reduction in contractual interest rates 
and postponement of payment of amortizations.
ence as Minister of Finance confirm that the Keynes-
ian measures, he took were not only appropriate, but 
necessary (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Exports, GDP growth, and Investments (1930-1935)
Year Exports GDP growth Investments (% GDP)
1930 319,4 -2,1 9,7 
1931 244,0 -3,3 7,6 
1932 179,4 4,3 7,2 
1933 216,8 8,9 8,8 
1934 292,8 9,2 10,6 
1935 269,5 3,0 13,1 
Source: Ipeadata.
Despite the importance of coffee for the Brazil-
ian economy, Aranha’s main task was to deal with 
the long renegotiation of external debt, which lasted 
until 1943, when he had already come back from the 
Brazilian embassy in Washington. The fall of the ex-
portations after 1929, plus the collapse of the interna-
tional financial market resulted in the interruption of 
the payment of the external debt on several occasions 
during the 1930s.
American and British governments did not recom-
mend a third funding loan, which would join several 
old debts into a new loan14. The report written by the 
British commissioner Otto Niemeyer, published in 
July 1931, suggested the simple adoption of an ortho-
dox economic policy: balanced budget, currency sta-
bilization and the creation of a Central Bank (Abreu, 
1974, 15). When the English government abandoned 
the Gold Standard, in September 1931, the interna-
tional crisis led the Brazilian government to declare 
the partial suspension of payment of its foreign debt 
in the same month.
From then on, there was no alternative for cred-
itors but to renegotiate a new consolidation, which 
the future Minister Oswaldo Aranha opposed at first 
— document signed by himself at the beginning of 
1932. The agreement required the full payment of the 
previous funding loans (1898 and 1914) and the offer 
of new bonds, with interest rate of 5% and maturity 
in 1934. The amortizations of those two loans were 
suspended, reducing the annual payment of debt ser-
vice from 24 to 12 million pounds (Abreu, 2010, 5).
However, the benefits of the agreement did not 
allow the payment of trade debts. In 1934, the min-
ister articulated a new agreement with the American 
government, known as the “Aranha scheme”. The 
agreement classified all the external loans in eight 
categories in order of ‘quality’; the better rated the 
loan, the greater the proportion of amortizations that 
would be paid. It was conditioned to the performance 
of the trade balance, around 9 million pounds a year, 
what Aranha classified as “a supreme effort to pay all 
that is possible to pay” (apud Hilton, 1994, 178).
Regarding this issue, the minister has always tried 
to involve his speeches in a nationalist rhetoric, claim-
ing to deal with “the authoritarian and dominating 
impositions of those who, lords of the world money, 
at one point made a loan to Brazil” (Aranha, 1934b). 
In any case, diplomatic circumstances allowed him to 
give the negotiations a nationalist aura15. Referring to 
creditors as “always lords of our destinies” (Aranha, 
1934a), Aranha adopted a more nationalist strategy to 
deal with the creditors16.
His stance reached a new level after ‘New State’ 
coup, in November 1937. Even though the situation 
of the balance of payments was under control, Vargas 
determined, against Aranha’s will, the interruption 
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of the 1934 agreement. Also, the president reintro-
duced the foreign exchange monopoly and declared 
a moratorium of the foreign debt. Seeking to co-opt 
the support of the Armed Forces, the president justi-
fied his decision focusing on the import of military 
and railway material. The real motivation of default, 
however, has been didactically described by Abreu 
(1975, 87): the government abandoned the strategy 
of “what the minimum that creditors will accept” to 
embrace the strategy of “what the maximum we can 
pay without limit imports”.
The solution for the situation started to be clear 
after Roosevelt’s invitation to Aranha to visit him 
at the White House in February 1939. The so-called 
“Aranha mission” marked the beginning of a new 
relationship between countries, considering that, be-
yond the external debt, Brazil could guarantee other 
positive results, including trade and investment is-
sues17. Regarding the debt negotiation, however, the 
benefits were below the expectations. After reestab-
lishing the payment of the debt and the liberalization 
of the exchange rate policy, Aranha arranged a credit 
line with Eximbank of US$ 19.2 million, less than 
half the amount initially required (Abreu, 2014, 94).
Despite the wide negative repercussion in Bra-
zil, the chancellor sought to involve the mission in 
a nationalist aura when he returned to Rio de Janei-
ro: “The Brazilian people understood that they need 
to grow from themselves, with decision and even 
sacrifice, because otherwise Brazil would continue 
to be the rich man of the desert: to beg in his own 
greatness” (Aranha, 1939). Besides, he resorted to 
politically incorrect analogies to distinguish Brazil’s 
situation from other third-world countries:
It was time to say that we were a people who had 
mastered their destiny; a great nation that had resolved 
to become greater; a force that wanted to cooperate 
with other American forces so that America was not 
an Africa in disguise, but the land chosen for the lives 
of free, strong, friendly, prosperous, and peaceful peo-
ples. (Aranha, 1939)
Aranha’s role in negotiating foreign debt can be 
considered relatively successful, given that, in the 
early 1930s, Brazil paid more than its trade balance 
allowed; from 1937, the situation was the opposite, 
because the government spent less resources to pay 
the debt than indicated by its presumed “capacity to 
pay”. Therefore, political factors became fundamen-
tal, such as the eminent position of Brazilian negoti-
ators.
Besides frustrating the approximation of part of 
the Brazilian Armed Forces to Nazi Germany on the 
17 Under Aranha’s coordination, the Brazilian delegation drew up two documents listing a series of proposals to be negotiated with North American 
peers (Brazil’s Economic Equipment and Agricultural Cooperation). According to Corsi (2012, 244), however, the reports had important divergenc-
es between them, especially regarding to the role of the domestic market and national capital for the development of the country.
18 Although the agreement provided for the entry of capital goods exempt from tariff - a measure that could attract investments to Brazilian industry 
-, some industrialists, led by Roberto Simonsen and Euvaldo Lodi, opposed the agreement, because they feared competition in light manufacturing 
sectors. The opposition to the agreement was only overcame the following year, after intense American pressure based on the threat of the imposi-
eve of World War II, Aranha’s nearness to the United 
States contributed to the Brazilian industrialization 
project. Aware that the development of the industry 
would only be possible if associated with foreign 
capital, Aranha declared that the “Vargas program 
of industrialization (...) should be carried out with 
increasing American support” (apud Hilton, 1994, 
411). The highlight of this relationship occurred with 
the creation of National Steel Company (CSN), in 
Volta Redonda, whose negotiation was involved in 
the well-known Brazilian bargain that opposed Ger-
man and American interests. Finally inaugurated in 
1941, CSN was financed and built with resources 
from the United States.
Foreign investment was not the only factor respon-
sible for the robust industrial growth observed in the 
1930s, however. The Brazilian government, and in 
particular, Minister Oswaldo Aranha, adopted several 
protectionist instruments to make national manufac-
turing viable, such as the increase of specific taxes, 
regulation of the compulsory consumption of national 
raw materials and a ban on imports of equipment for 
certain industries that could be produced in Brazil.
In 1934, Aranha signed a tariff reform with a clear 
protectionist bias, whereby the specific aggregate tar-
iff was increased by 15% and doubled the number of 
tariff items. The main mechanism of trade protection 
resulted, however, from the devaluation of the Bra-
zilian currency (mil-réis), which overlapped the other 
measures to defend Brazilian production. According 
to Abreu (2014, 89), it was a clear industrial protec-
tion policy, otherwise “it would be difficult to explain 
the considerable increase in the industrial product that 
characterized the decade after 1933”. Fonseca (2003, 
15) agrees with this point of view, arguing that it is 
possible to “inquire to what extent the government 
was aware of the depth” of its protective policy; but 
the industrial growth observed from that moment on 
should not be delegated to “fortuitous act, the result 
of chance, disconnected from the new directions giv-
en to the economy”.
Despite a speech given some weeks before, the 
signing of the trade agreement with the United States 
in 1935 was largely result of Aranha’s efforts. The 
vehemence with which he initially opposed the treaty 
proved to be a rhetorical game to contribute to the 
approval of the 1934 Constitution. He later classified 
it as “an important event for the world economy” 
(apud Hilton, 1994, 224), as the agreement increased 
trade between countries by favoring the importation 
of more than 30 American products, while lowering 
or excluding the tariff for the main items exported by 
Brazil, such as coffee and cocoa. Even though Bra-
zilian industrialists have opposed the treaty18, it is not 
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possible to state that there was an excessive liberal-
ization to foreign manufactured goods, considering 
the tariff increase that occurred before the beginning 
of negotiations.
As argued along the section, it is possible to char-
acterize Oswaldo Aranha’s first experience at the 
Ministry of Finance as “highly interventionist and 
nationalist” (Simonsen, 1996, 384). His economic 
administration could be considered heterodox, which 
brought beneficial results for the country. Although 
his economic ideas have considerably changed in the 
following decades, Aranha would intervene in the 
economy once more during the 1950s, when he took 
office for the second time. The minister had changed, 
the circumstances too.
3.2. Vargas’ second administration (1951-1954)
Aranha returned to public administration when he 
took over amid the severe economic crisis of the ear-
ly 1950s. Besides the inflationary acceleration, the 
external situation was, again, the main problem of the 
Brazilian economy. When he took over the Ministry 
of Finance in June 1953, Aranha was an experienced 
politician with more liberal ideas than in his first ex-
perience.
Oswaldo Aranha had decided to maintain the 
economic policy of his predecessor, the industrial-
ist Horácio Lafer: conservative fiscal, monetary and 
credit policies19. At that time, he defended austerity 
as a means of containing the inflationary process: 
“Inflation in our country has been sporadically com-
bated, through partial measures that are invalidated 
because the main loopholes of the inflationary wave 
remain generally open: government deficits (...) and 
the immoderate expansion of bank credit granted to 
private sectors” (Aranha, 1953a).
Thus, the “Aranha Plan” proposed a rigorous 
global adjustment, whose main proposals could be 
summarized in:
Energetically compress the global volume of gov-
ernment spending on goods and services; lower the an-
nual pace at which public works are currently expand-
ing; prudently contain the speed of the industrialization 
process; apply strict selective controls to imports in ac-
cordance with the investment policy and the balance of 
payments possibilities; defend the stability of the inter-
nal purchasing power of the cruise and its international 
parity, by the cessation of emissions (...) as well as by 
a sound credit policy. (Aranha, 1953a)
tion of a tariff on Brazilian coffee.
19 Apparently, it was due to an Aranha’s advice that Minister Horacio Lafer adopted the so-called ‘Campos Salles-Rodrigues Alves formula’. Ac-
cording to what had been carried out by these two presidents during the ‘Old Republic’ (1894-1930), economic policy would be divided into two 
steps: first, stability would be prioritized, focusing efforts on fiscal adjustment, and combating inflation. Once these imbalances are resolved, the 
government would then be able to stimulate the expansion of aggregate demand and, ultimately, sustained economic development.
20 At that moment, politically and intellectually more mature, Aranha started to quote liberal economists to ratify the prudence of his measure. Quoting 
Gottfried von Haberler, an Austrian School economist, the minister tried to confer an orthodox approval to his policies. Eugênio Gudin himself had 
already endorsed the plausibility of the measure in his Principles of Monetary Economics (1943).
Months later, however, Aranha noticed that the 
goals initially stipulated would not be achieved. Fis-
cal and credit policies did not achieve the intended 
contraction, strengthening the inflationary process. 
The minister himself summed up the difficulty in pro-
moting the adjustment: “The first six months of my 
administration did not produce the minimum results 
that I could expect... There were deficit and emission, 
reduction in the purchasing power of the currency, in-
crease in the cost of living, general imbalance” (apud 
Hilton, 1994, 474). The nominal increase of 100% 
of the minimum wage, enacted in May 1954, further 
weakened the already fragile fiscal situation. Oswal-
do opposed the measure, proposing a readjustment 
of 33%. The intensification of the political crisis, 
however, no longer allowed the government to take 
“half-measures”.
On the international front, the currency crisis 
was no less severe. The deterioration of the exter-
nal scenario, with the outbreak of the Korean War 
(1950-1953) and the election of Republican president 
Dwight Eisenhower in the United States - less friend-
ly to the ‘good neighborhood’ policy in Latin Amer-
ica. As result, the second part of an Eximbank loan 
(US$ 60 million) was cancelled. Besides, problems 
in coffee exports forced the Brazilian government to 
adjust its balance of payments in a very strict way.
In October 1953, the government enacted its 
boldest measure, the Instruction 70 of the Superin-
tendence of Currency and Credit (SUMOC)20. The 
exchange rate liberal policy did not achieve its goals 
–“effects were contrary to the purposes most sought 
by the law, of attracting foreign capital and stimulat-
ing exports” (Aranha, 1953b)–, the minister created 
a mechanism for stabilizing and devaluing exchange 
rates, mitigating, however, its expected deleterious 
effects. The fixed exchange rate was maintained, 
but in practice, it was institutionalized the multiple 
rate system: two categories for exports (coffee and 
other products) and five for imports, according to its 
essentiality for the Import substitution industriali-
zation (ISI). Thus, imports would be subsidized the 
more indispensable they were for the ISI, so that the 
more “essential”, the lower the premium above the 
official rate to be paid in the auction. For exports, a 
bonus would be paid on the official exchange rate, 
making the rates more attractive to the exporter than 
those practiced on the free market.
In the short term, the results were favorable since 
the government managed to mitigate the deleterious 
effects of the currency crisis. In 1953, the trade bal-
ance had a positive result, contributing for the slight 
surplus of the balance of payments. Inflation, howev-
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er, accelerated to 20% at the end of that year. Facing 
such important challenges, the political crisis did not 
contribute for the success of Aranha’s measures. Some 
days before President Vargas’ suicide, Aranha also 
sought to change the exchange rate system for export 
bonuses, an attempt that would result in a small in-
crease in coffee sales in subsequent days, only.
At that moment, any effort would be harmless, 
however. The shot at Catete Palace shorten his sec-
ond term at the Ministry, as well as his own political 
career by interrupting the life of the president who, in 
fact, made history.
4. Concluding remarks
Oswaldo Aranha’s achievements in the international 
arena may justify the importance given to his diplo-
matic career. Still, his foray into the economic field 
should not be diminished. Lawyer with no formal 
training in economic issues, the minister responsi-
ble for planning the accelerated industrialization of 
the 1930s directly influenced the development of the 
Brazilian economy during Getúlio Vargas’s terms.
Aranha’s liberal convictions were useful in his 
experiences at the Ministry of Finance; the interven-
tionist lessons learned from the political daily life, 
besides being useful, were also functional. The de-
fense of coffee, whose exports were the dynamic 
center of the national economy, demanded the direct 
action of the State. According to the classical Celso 
Furtado’s explanation (1982), countercyclical action 
helped the country not only to overcome the crisis 
earlier than most of the developed countries, but also 
managed to encourage the industrial sector as never 
seen before in Brazilian history.
During the renegotiation of foreign debt, the col-
lapse of international financing resulted in no other 
alternative but to control imports and reschedule the 
debt. Diplomat by vocation, Aranha (and, later, Ar-
tur Souza Costa, Minister of Finance who succeeded 
him) delivered, in 1943, a much more comfortable 
situation in terms of its financial commitments, even 
though the cost of a clear submission to American 
diplomacy interests.
In the 1950s, in addition to the obvious curren-
cy devaluation required by the circumstances, the 
exchange auction system brought a temporary relief 
to external accounts. The deterioration of the polit-
ical situation, plus the difficulties in attracting dol-
lars, made his second administration at the head of 
the Treasury not to have the proper importance in the 
literature.
Thus, according to Simonsen’s (1996) observa-
tion, it was not (only) Oswaldo Aranha’s ideas that 
had been transformed; the problem to be faced had 
also changed. Therefore, a politician who professed 
liberal dogmas choosing interventionists policies was 
not exactly a contradiction; it demonstrates his ability 
to learn and to act in a multifaceted reality.
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